Our methodology focuses on the "shift left" paradigm. By auditing architectural logic, trust boundaries, and data flows early in the development lifecycle, we help identify design-level security risks before they become costly issues. This approach complements penetration testing and code review by uncovering potential vulnerabilities earlier and improving the overall security posture of the system.
“We built Super Tanks on a simple principle: unsafe agent actions should be stopped before they execute, not explained after the damage is done. An independent threat model isn’t a stamp of approval - it’s a map of where to look. We’re grateful 7ASecurity gave us that map, and we’re using it to guide the next round of hardening.”
Identify architectural weaknesses before they are built into the codebase.
Visualize and shrink the digital footprint exposed to malicious actors.
Trace the logical hops an attacker takes to reach your crown jewels.
Empower developers with a clear roadmap of security requirements.
Streamline compliance by proving 'Security by Design' to auditors.
We founded 7ASecurity in 2011 with a clear goal: security work should find real weaknesses and produce useful guidance, not generic paperwork. Our software threat models follow that same principle.
We combine structured methodology with attacker thinking. We use frameworks such as STRIDE where useful, but we do not treat threat modeling as a checkbox exercise. Our team looks at how your software is actually designed, how data moves, how components trust each other, how users and services interact, and how attackers could chain small weaknesses into meaningful impact.
Specialized modeling for LLM-integrated systems, focusing on prompt injection, data leakage via RAG, and agentic autonomy risks.
Evaluates trust boundaries, tool permissions, approval workflows, and secure agent behavior.
Software Threat Modeling is a structured approach to identifying security risks during the design phase of software development. Our workflow analyzes system architecture, data flows, trust boundaries, and potential attack paths to uncover design-level weaknesses and guide secure implementation decisions.
| Feature | Threat Modeling | Pentesting | Code Review | Supply Chain Audit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Best For | Design | Live Systems | Source Code | CI/CD |
| Focus | Architecture | Exploitation | Implementation Security | Build Security |
| Key Question | What could go wrong? | Can it be exploited? | Is the code secure? | Is the pipeline secure? |
| Finds | Design Risks | Vulnerabilities | Code Flaws | Process Risks |
| Deliverable | Threat Model | Test Report | Review Report | Audit Report |
| Ideal Stage | Before Build | Before Release | During Dev | Before Deployment |
We frequently support:
The exact access depends on scope, but useful inputs usually include:
A software threat model is a structured analysis of how attackers could abuse a software system’s architecture, dataflows, trust boundaries, actors, and controls.
It helps teams identify design-level risks before or after implementation and turns those risks into practical security recommendations.
No. A software threat model focuses on design and architecture, while a penetration test focuses on whether vulnerabilities can be exploited in a running system.
Both are valuable. Threat modeling is often most useful before launch or before major architectural decisions are finalized. Penetration testing is most useful once a system is deployed or testable.
Not always. A useful threat model can be produced from architecture diagrams, documentation, design walkthroughs, API specifications, and interviews.
Source code access can improve accuracy when the implementation details matter, but we will define the right level of access during scoping.
Yes. We can model risks in AI-agent and LLM-based systems, including tool permissions, memory, approval workflows, gateway enforcement, code execution, external integrations, and auditability.
The Super Tanks engagement is a good example of practical threat modeling for autonomous-agent governance.
The timeline depends on scope, documentation quality, system complexity, and how much interaction is needed with the engineering team.
A focused lightweight model can be short, while a complex platform with many integrations requires more time. We will define the expected effort during the free scoping discussion.
You receive clear documentation describing the model, key assets, actors, dataflows, trust boundaries, realistic threats, control gaps, and prioritized recommendations.
The goal is to give leadership enough context to understand risk and engineering teams enough detail to act.
Identify design-level security risks before they become expensive production problems. Schedule a Software Threat Modeling engagement to understand how attackers could abuse your architecture, data flows, trust boundaries, APIs, and critical assets.
Evaluate your system architecture, actors and assets, data flows, trust boundaries, authentication mechanisms, integrations, security controls, and potential attack paths to uncover weaknesses before they are built into the product.
Receive clear documentation of realistic abuse cases, design risks, attack paths, and recommended security controls so your engineering team has a practical roadmap for building and maintaining more secure software.